The Seeds of Regionalism
Harland Bartholomew and the
Origins of St. Louis Regionalism
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Harland Bartholomew at
mid-century.
(Photo: Parsons/HBA)

St. Louis is usually not associated with regionalism.
Some would even contend that St. Louisans take a
perverse pride in their disjointed approach to regional
issues. Local urban scholar Terry Jones goes so far as to
argue that St. Louis is “fragmented by design.”1 What
most St. Louisans do not realize, however, is that St. Louis
was at the forefront of thinking about regional governance
and regional planning for much of the twentieth century.

(Photo: Christopher Duggan, Lindenwood University)
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In a way, this is not too surprising. Circumstances forced it to be.
Because of the city/county divorce of 1876 where St. Louis City
became a separate county from St. Louis County, the region was
already hamstrung in its approach to metropolitan issues during
the nineteenth century. While the city boundaries that were carved
out in the 1876 agreement were anticipated to give the city enough
room to grow for a hundred years or more, the streetcar brought
development to the western fringes in less than half a generation.2
Even before the arrival of the automobile, which accelerated urban
growth, city leaders were talking about the need to annex parts of
the county to control development taking place in the suburbs. By
the time of the 1907 Civic League plan—the first comprehensive
city plan in the country—the first generation of St. Louis planners
was already quite aware that the “real city” was larger than the
political city of St. Louis, and the city/county split was already
putting this real St. Louis at a disadvantage in its competition with
other major metropolitan areas around the country.3
Although legions of St. Louisans—both inside and outside the
old political city—have attempted to formulate solutions to St.
Louis’ regional dilemma, the one person who stands out is Harland
Bartholomew, the long time director of St. Louis’ city planning
department, as well as a noted professor of urban planning at
the University of Illinois and the founder of the world’s largest
planning firm, Harland Bartholomew and Associates (HBA),
which was headquartered in St. Louis. While Bartholomew has
come under intense scrutiny during the last year due to Colin
Gordon’s criticism of his and HBA’s role in contributing to the
region’s hyper-racial segregation in his book, Mapping Decline,
Bartholomew was a leader both in the region and nationally in
promoting regional coordination to direct out-of-control urban
growth caused by suburbanization a generation ago.4 Today, many
St. Louis planners and metropolitan officials lament the fact that
the region does not possess some form of metropolitan government
or have a metropolitan plan. Yet Bartholomew and HBA drafted
a guide or an outline of what a regional government might look
like and what a regional plan might entail as early as 1948 for
the Metropolitan Plan Association. As the region now faces the
prospect of slipping into the third tier of American cities, maybe it
is time to follow Bartholomew’s lead sixty years later.
THE EMERGENCE OF ST. LOUIS REGIONALISM
Although St. Louis has a national reputation for its fragmented
state, cities across America have been combating regional political
disorganization since before the Civil War. Indeed, Boston was
ringed by peripheral towns within six years of its founding in
1630. Even St. Louis had suburbs, such as Carondolet, before
1800. However, before the Civil War and well after, most suburbs
around the country eagerly sought annexation to defray the cost of
desired services. Consequently, regional coordination was seldom
an issue since suburbs generally followed the lead of the central city
whenever a particular situation demanded a regional response in an
effort to entice the central city into wanting to annex them.
But as cities became larger through industrialization and with the
advent of the streetcar, some suburbs—especially the more affluent
ones—deliberately sought to avoid annexation to escape central
city control and central city taxes. By 1900, most major American
cities were ringed by suburbs that were determined to remain
separate from the central city. Of course, St. Louis was even more
entrenched in this pattern than most other cities because of the city/
county divorce of 1876, as well as the fact that the Mississippi was
both a natural and a political divider. While most St. Louisans did
not anticipate that the city would grow out to its borders within a
generation of the city/county split, by the time of the World’s Fair
in 1904, already St. Louis and Clayton were almost touching to the
west and to the east, with several industrial suburbs sprouting up on
the other side of the Mississippi in Illinois.
By the turn of the century, suburbanization was already causing
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regional problems for many American cities. The need to coordinate
streetcar lines, provide water and sewer service, build and pave
streets, and control pollution did not stop at the city limits as the
“real city” grew beyond political borders. In some states, cities
found sympathetic state legislatures and courts that allowed them
greater power to annex surrounding areas.5 But in Missouri, there
was little the legislature could do to help St. Louis. Because the
1875 legislation that established the eventual split between city and
county had made St. Louis both a city and a county, any annexation
made by the city required a statewide referendum. As a result,
St. Louis had few options for coordinating activity in St. Louis
County with developments in the city.
Although the Civic League alluded to the already negative
impact that St. Louis’ inability to annex was having on the city in
its 1907 plan, it was ten years before St. Louis’ new, young planner,
Harland Bartholomew, was even more forceful in his observations
concerning regional fragmentation. In a document entitled The
Problems of St. Louis, Bartholomew listed “the extension of the
city limits, or power of the city to secure greater uniformity and
permanency of development” as one of the four principal problems
confronting St. Louis.6 As he explained, since 1900 “great increases
have occurred outside the city limits and no concerted effort has
been made to permit the city to benefit by the increase for which
it is responsible.” But according to Bartholomew, “population
increase [was] not the most serious concern of St. Louis.” For him,
the real problem was that new factories were locating in the county
even though there was still an abundance of appropriate vacant land
in St. Louis itself. As a result, many residents, many of whom were
quite affluent, were leaving the city, causing “several large, local,

Bartholomew’s office often used this chart to demonstrate
the need for planners to incorporate rapid expansion of
automobiles. In this one, the density of cars on highways more
than doubled during the 1920s.
(Photo: Guide plan, Missouri-Illinois metropolitan area…1948, Harland
Bartholomew and Associates. University Archives, Department of Special
Collections, Washington University Libraries)

amount, the two cities that were the most
choked off from their suburbs were Boston
and St. Louis. Consequently, they were
the most aggressive in trying to rectify
(Photo: St. Louis County Watchman Advocate, September 7, 1926; State Historical Society of Missouri)
the situation. Both attempted to persuade
their state legislatures to give them the
power to consolidate their adjoining
suburbs inside their political structures.
Boston tried repeatedly in the 1920s to get
legislative approval, but was unsuccessful.
St. Louis was not only able to convince
the legislature that it needed more latitude
in adjusting its boundaries, but it was able
to convince statewide voters as well. In
1924, Missourians approved a format for
modifying the city boundaries. Under the
scheme, a board of freeholders (property
owners) would be formed—nine from the
city and nine from the county—that would
come up with a new city map that would be
eventually voted on by the entire state.9
After a couple of missteps, the board
finally came up with a plan in 1926
which called for the consolidation of the
City of St. Louis with the entire County
of St. Louis. In effect, the plan called
for the creation of a municipality that
would have been 553 square miles. The
County’s response to the plan was quick
and devastating. The editor of the Webster
Groves newspaper told his readers that
Webster Groves “would gain absolutely
nothing from such a plan” and that a union
with the big city of St. Louis would result
only in Webster Groves being bombarded
by evil influences like “saloons, soft
drink parlors, pool rooms, dance halls
and this type of undesirable so-called
amusements.”10 With World War I still
fresh in his memory, one county probate
formerly exclusive residence areas [to be] deserted by original
judge likened St. Louis to Germany and its
owners and occupants, only to rapidly deteriorate, or in some
autocratic government under the Kaiser, recalling, “We sacrificed
instances, to be completely abandoned, to the great detriment of the our men and money to preserve local self-government for Belgium
property and depreciation of property values.”7
and France.” When the election finally came, St. Louis County
What Bartholomew did not anticipate in 1917 was that the
voters showed their disdain for the plan by voting against it two
problem was about to get much worse for not just St. Louis, but
to one. In one mostly rural precinct, the vote was 274 to one
also for cities across the country. Although he would later become
against the plan.11 Although outstate voters were not as vehemently
an expert on its impact and strategies for addressing the challenges
opposed to the enlarged St. Louis, they voted against it by a healthy
it wrought, Bartholomew did not foresee the degree to which the
margin as well.
automobile was about to totally restructure urban America. In 1917,
Yet, proponents of regional governance in St. Louis were not
the Model T had been around less than ten years, and there were
deterred. They were ready to try again four years later. But this
fewer than 8 million cars in the United States. However, between
time they came up with a radically different approach. Unlike the
1920 and 1930, American car registrations mushroomed from eight
scheme in 1926, St. Louis regionalists in 1930 did not propose
million to 24 million. At the very time that the political boundaries
consolidation, but federation. Taking their cue from London and
of American cities were being frozen, the automobile was doubling
the London County Council that had divided the 117-square-mile
the size of the streetcar city on which those boundaries were based.
county of London into 28 semi-autonomous boroughs in 1888,
In 1907, the streetcar was taking people from University City’s “the champions of a federative metropolis in St. Louis, like those around
Loop” to downtown in approximately 45 minutes. By 1917, the
the country, argued that a dual-level system brought efficiencies to
automobile was taking people from Richmond Heights and Ladue,
region-wide governance while retaining local identity and control.
several miles farther west to downtown, in the same amount of
Similar to the national government and the states, the idea was
time.8
that different governments would perform different functions.
By the 1920s, American city leaders were becoming aware that
Municipalities would have responsibility for some activities while
they were facing a crisis. While the growing size of the real city
the larger federative government would carry out those that were
was straining the services of the political city—suburbanites were
of concern to the entire region and which needed to be coordinated
clogging city streets with their new cars—the central city did not
to realize the greatest efficiency and rationality. As urban historian
have the revenue or the power to control this growth. Although
Jon Teaford points out, the concept was aimed at suburbanites
most major American cities were able to expand by a limited
who liked suburban life, but saw the need to address metropolitan
Labor Day weekend of 1926 also kicked off the political season, including this
cartoon opposing annexation by suggesting that it would cause a mass migration.
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concerns. “Such a scheme,” Teaford maintains, “appealed to many
of the twentieth-century Americans who sought a reconciliation
between city and suburb.”12 It was a way of having the best of
both worlds. Suburbanites could have the sense of community and
local control of the suburb, but still realize the economies of scale
associated with centralization.
This idea of a federative metropolis had been discussed in a
number of cities from the 1890s on. But St. Louis was only one
of three cities (Cleveland and Pittsburgh were the other two)
that attempted to push the idea through state governance for
ratification. In St. Louis, what is interesting is that the push did
not come from the central city, but the suburbs. Adjacent suburbs
such as University City and Clayton had become home to many
professionals and business-elites. These members of the new
professional class, like their counterparts around the country, had
been influenced by the ideas of efficiency experts like Frederick
Winslow Taylor and wanted to apply the ideas of scientific
management to governance. Devotees of rationality and order, these
suburbanites were appalled by the wastefulness of the tremendous
duplication of services that took place as each suburb tried to have
its own school system, its own fire department, its own police
department, and so forth. For them, the bottom line was getting
better services for lower taxes.13
The leader of the federative model in St. Louis was Robert
Roessel, the City Attorney in Webster Groves, who had been an
active opponent of the 1926 consolidation scheme. Roessel and
two of his anti-consolidation allies, Kirkwood businessman Joseph
Matthews and Washington University Professor George Stephens,
formed a committee sponsored by the St. Louis County Chamber
of Commerce in 1929 to push for a federative construct. Bringing
in federative government specialist Thomas Reed, Professor
of Municipal Government at the University of Michigan, the
committee developed a proposal for a “City of Greater St. Louis”
and was able to successfully petition the state legislature to submit
the proposal to a statewide vote in 1930.14
As in 1926, public sentiment proved to be violently divided.
Outstate farmers seemed to be generally confused and apathetic

about the issue. City businesses and the newspapers were for
federation, but city politicians were generally against it, fearing
a loss of clout. For the most part, the strongest suburban support
came from inner ring, affluent suburbs such as University City
and Richmond Heights. On the other hand, the greatest opposition
came from the farmers in St. Louis County, as well as residents
of detached suburbs, especially those with their own histories
like Roessel’s own Webster Groves. Indeed, the editor of the
Webster Groves newspaper—the same editor who feared in 1926
that consolidation would bring pool halls and soda parlors to
the city—suggested that if the petition passed, city police would
replace local ones and that Webster Groves would end up like St.
Louis where “gangsters run wild, murderers go uncaught and banks
are robbed without any arrests.”15 In the end, the voters agreed with
the Webster Groves editor. While the proposal won in the city and
in a few close-in suburbs, it lost outstate and in most suburbs. In
St. Louis County, the vote went 60/40 against. While the framers
of the plan could have done more to specify what powers the new
federative city would have, suburban residents were not ready to
relinquish power to address regional interests in 1930.16 Despite the
fact that it took longer, federation plans were defeated in Pittsburgh
and Cleveland as well.17
The Regional Plan—A Different Approach
By the mid-1920s, many regionalists across the country
had resigned themselves to the improbability that any type
of metropolitan consolidation would ever come about—at
least not any time soon. Yet realizing that the automobile and
industrialization had produced a new urban form almost overnight
and that this “new” city presented new challenges and opportunities
which demanded to be addressed, these “pragmatic” regionalists
attempted to formulate an alternative strategy to consolidation and/
or federation to confront the new metropolis. For those regionalists
who were involved with or attracted to the new field of urban
planning, they did not have far to look. Familiar with the concept
of the comprehensive plan where cities would attempt to formulate
an integrated or comprehensive tactical direction for the city as

Critics accused St. Louis city officials of nefariously proposing annexation to reap revenues from the burgeoning county.
(Photo: St. Louis County Leader, June 18, 1926; State Historical Society of Missouri)
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In 1926, opponents of increased regionalism thought the city of St. Louis would swallow up the
county and its interests, like a spider catching flies in its web.
(Photo: St. Louis County Leader, October 15, 1926; State Historical Society of Missouri)
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would discover that he had identified virtually every environmental
and infrastructural challenge that would plague the Bay Area for the
next forty years.18
St. Louis’ Entry into Regional Planning
While Bartholomew was quite active in regional planning
throughout the 1920s, it was not until the end of the decade that
St. Louis made its first foray into this new field with the formation
of the St. Louis Regional Planning Federation in 1929. But, this
new entity was essentially stillborn due to the onslaught of the
Great Depression. Yet it was the Depression and the New Deal
that brought the Federation and St. Louis regional planning to the
forefront.
When Franklin Roosevelt came into office in 1933, he came with
a long familiarity with and commitment to planning. Although
many conservatives were convinced that he was intent on instituting
Soviet-style state planning, Roosevelt was primarily interested
in using planning to support rather than replace the market and
free enterprise. Even the National Industrial Recovery Act, which
created the National Recovery Administration (NRA) with its wage
and price controls, was meant to save the existing business structure
in the United States. But it was the Recovery Act that vastly
expanded planning in American life in the thirties and was the
force that brought regional planning to life in St. Louis.
Opponents of annexation thought taxes would increase,
robbing citizens of hard-earned dollars during the Great
Depression like a thug waiting to mug them from a dark alley.
(Photo: St. Louis County Watchman Advocate, May 10, 1930; State
Historical Society of Missouri)

a whole for twenty years or more, these planning proponents
advocated generating a comprehensive plan for the entire region
and not just the central city. Such an approach would not deny
local identity or control, but would seek to coordinate the actions
and policies of counties and municipalities to address rationally
metropolitan concerns common to the entire region.
The first efforts at formulating regional plans came on the coasts
in the early 1920s. New York and Los Angeles began working on
regional plans at almost the same time. In New York, the pressure
came from the realization that the functional city stretched across
three states. Transportation, sanitation, and economic activities
of this vast region demanded coordination. In Los Angeles, the
automobile had stimulated explosive growth in the 1910s and
early 1920s that had overwhelmed the abilities of the suburban
communities to provide adequate services. For both cities,
something simply had to be done.
What is interesting is that St. Louis’ own Harland Bartholomew
was part of both regions’ “all-star” planning teams. Seen as pathbreaking work, these first two regional plans attracted “who was
who” in the planning field in the early twenties. Although he was
the youngest planner on both these teams, it was not surprising
that Bartholomew had been sought to be a part of these massive
undertakings. He and his firm already had an extensive list of
completed, comprehensive plans around the country.
Due to the stir that both plans caused, other regions across the
country drafted plans modeled after those of New York and Los
Angeles. The most ambitious of this second wave of regional plans
was prepared by San Francisco. The Regional Plan Association of
San Francisco Bay Counties hired Bartholomew to coordinate the
regional plan for the nine-county Bay Area. The first stage of the
planning process was a report on the physical challenges facing the
region. The report that Bartholomew generated became a template
for regional planners across the country. Later, Bay Area planners
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Just days before the 1930 election, the St. Louis County
Leader ran this cartoon on the front page, featuring a taxpayer
fleeing the Four Horsemen of the annexation apocalypse,
including threats of property confiscation.
(Photo: St. Louis County Leader, October 31, 1930; State Historical Society
of Missouri)

The tie between the Recovery Act and planning was Title II of the tremendous bombing, forced Europeans to contemplate how they
act that established the Public Works Administration (PWA), which
were going to restructure their cities even before the end of the war.
was designed to carry out and stimulate work relief projects. Harold In America, a similar frame of mind was emerging. By the end of
Ickes, who was Secretary of the Interior and was over the agency in the war, most American cities had experienced a fifteen-year hiatus
from development, and urban areas that had started to show signs of
which the PWA was placed, created the National Planning Board to
disinvestment before the Depression were in a catastrophic state of
advise him on the selection and scheduling of these projects. While
disrepair. Moreover, what building had occurred during the war had
Ickes saw the immediate use of the Board in advising him on work
taken place in the suburbs, straining even further the overburdened
relief projects, he encouraged the Board to stimulate state and local
regional services. Like their European colleagues, American
planning.
planners were looking at the end of the war as both an imperative
One of the initiatives which the Board eventually undertook
and an opportunity to rebuild the metropolis.
was the formation of a subcommittee to oversee metropolitan or
regional planning projects. Before the ink was dry authorizing
Most Americans know the story of “urban renewal” that brought
the project, the St. Louis Federation applied for funds to support
about public housing, central city freeways, and massive clearance
the preparation of a regional or metropolitan plan. At the Board’s
of perceived slum areas in the postwar period. What most people
suggestion, the Federation was transformed
into a commission that had representatives
Bartholomew was one of the first planners to use the word “sprawl” to describe
from the city government and seven
haphazard suburban growth. What he proposed instead was managed metropolitan
surrounding counties. The first act of this
growth where new development would be funneled out along transportation and
new commission was hiring Bartholomew
infrastructure corridors that would maximize the use of resources and preserve open
to write a preliminary report on regional
space—an idea advocated by today’s environmentalists.
conditions and recommendations. After
this preliminary report, the commission
(Photo: Guide plan, Missouri-Illinois metropolitan area…1948, Harland Bartholomew and Associates, p.
authorized a follow-up report by
15. University Archives, Department of Special Collections, Washington University Libraries)
Bartholomew, released in 1936. In this
report, Bartholomew recommended
forming a five-member agency that would
be established by the Illinois and Missouri
legislatures and would direct development
throughout the bi-state region. Naturally,
having been an active foot soldier in the
regional planning movement for fifteen
years, Bartholomew went on to recommend
that one of the first acts of this new agency
should be the preparation and adoption of
a metropolitan plan. The emphasis of this
plan, Bartholomew suggested, would be
on sanitation, transportation, highways,
and recreation problems facing the St.
Louis metropolitan region.19 It looked like
Bartholomew was finally on his way to
drafting a regional plan for his own region.
The Metropolitan Plan
Association and the 1948
Guide Plan
But again, Bartholomew was thwarted
by the timing of events. A new economic
downturn and World War II got in his way.
As it did for cities around the country, the
recession of 1937 and the onset of the war
derailed planning in St. Louis. While the
New Deal had stimulated planning activity,
FDR’s efforts to reduce spending and the
mounting deficit in his second term took
away the one source of planning support
during the Great Depression. Although
World War II “cured” the Depression, the
war diverted all federal monies away from
unnecessary social or economic activities,
like planning, which were not seen as
crucial to the war effort or maintaining the
home front.
However, the war would ultimately
lead many people to take city and regional
planning even more seriously. The
devastation of European cities, especially
those in England that had withstood
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When the City of St. Louis acquired Lambert Field in 1927, it became the first municipal airport in the United States. This
terminal at Lambert, designed by Minoru Yamasaki, was completed in 1956. (Photo: Christopher Duggan, Lindenwood University)
do not know is that Bartholomew was a central character in this
story in St. Louis and elsewhere. His 1947 Comprehensive Plan
for St. Louis is perhaps the most famous—some critics would say
infamous—blueprint for rebuilding the American inner city.20 It
was this document that laid the foundation for projects like the

Cartoons such as this one appeared in two St. Louis county
newspapers on the same day, threatening a major tax increase
through annexation that would be as unexpected as a crying
newborn.
(Photo: St. Louis County Watchman Advocate and St. Louis County Leader,
October 24, 1930; State Historical Society of Missouri)
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Mill Creek Redevelopment Project, the Pruitt-Igoe Public Housing
Project (though Bartholomew did not approve of high-rise public
housing), and the expansion of Highway U.S. 40 in the 1950s and
1960s.21
What most people do not realize is that planners of the period,
especially Bartholomew, saw the remaking of the American city as
a two-stage process. Like many of his fellow planners of the period,
Bartholomew felt that the central cities needed to be rebuilt, but
this had to be accompanied by the simultaneous restructuring of the
periphery. If suburban growth was not controlled, the infrastructure
needs alone of the new developments would overwhelm municipal
governance and resources. In effect, each region would be building
a parallel city, each with its own separate sewers, water system,
highways, utilities, and public buildings. As they did so, regions
would be not only shortchanging the present, but the future, too. In
Bartholomew’s mind, the impending post-war situation convinced
him even more of something that he had been thinking for twenty
years. The new city demanded not only metropolitan planning but
also the power to implement those plans on a regional basis.
Consequently, Bartholomew was undoubtedly behind the creation
of a new regional citizens’ group in St. Louis in 1944 called the
Metropolitan Plan Association (MPA), which took up his call in the
1936 report for a new governing body that would direct regional
development and planning. While it took three years to accomplish,
the first order of business for the MPA was lobbying for legislation
in both Illinois and Missouri to create an interim commission to
“prepare a program of organization and administration whereby
the affected communities of the area may most effectively plan
and guide the development of the area in matters which are of
concern to the area as a whole.” The ultimate goal of Bartholomew
and the MPA was for this commission to study “the advisability of
establishing a permanent bi-state administrative body.”22
Yet feeling that time was of the essence and that it might take
years for this bi-state agency to be created, Bartholomew and the
MPA felt it was necessary to outline what a metropolitan plan was
and what this proposed bi-state agency might look like. So almost
immediately after passage of the legislation, MPA hired HBA to

prepare a “guide plan” for the St. Louis metropolitan region.
As Malcolm Elliott, the president of the Association, explained
in his foreword, the purpose of the plan was “to bring into clearer
focus the major metropolitan-wide development problems.”
Moreover, it was intended to show “the proper relationship of
these problems to each other and to the development of the whole
metropolitan area as integral parts of one great interdependent
economic unit.” However, Elliott argued, the main value of the
guide plan was in giving the new Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan
Development Commission “a starting-point for its deliberations
and in giving them a reliable and comprehensive view of the
metropolitan situation.”23
The plan was a concise document. It was only 54 pages long
including introductory material plus plats and tables. The body
of the plan was divided into four main sections that grouped the
reports of the fourteen committees into which the MPA was divided,
as well as a concluding essay on the function of the proposed
permanent metropolitan agency.
But before discussing his main planning elements, Bartholomew
opened the plan by laying the foundation of why a regional plan
was necessary in the first place. He most wanted to convince St.
Louisans, both those living in the city and those who resided in the
suburbs, that the study area of the plan (which included the City
of St. Louis plus St. Charles, St. Louis, Madison, Monroe, and St.
Clair counties) was “basically just one big city.” As Bartholomew
explained in his introductory essay, the region had become an

“urban community grown large,” because of its geographical
location, “unusual transportation facilities,” natural resources,
and the “enterprise of its people.” But for Bartholomew this was
both a good thing and a bad thing. Although the St. Louis region
had become one of the largest metropolises in America, “growth
brings change,” Bartholomew reminded his readers. This region
had outgrown the facilities that had served the pre-automotive
city. What this meant, according to Bartholomew, was that these
facilities had to “be re-designed and supplemented in scale with the
changing city—the modern metropolitan community.”24
Bartholomew went on to ask rhetorically, “Why hasn’t this been
done already?” He then responded, “The plain answer [was] that
our governmental machinery has not expanded as rapidly as the
physical growth.” Instead of having one structure that could address
the needs of the metropolitan area as a whole, a “multiplicity of
governmental units” existed. In Bartholomew’s mind, this had
resulted in St. Louis becoming a disjointed, fragmented mess.
“Plans for a great city,” he told his fellow Greater St. Louisans,
“cannot be prepared by a convention of communities.” The modern
metropolis required planning that was metropolitan in scope and
perspective. “We need a new approach,” he said, one that would
lead to “big plans for the new big city.” But for Bartholomew,
planning was not enough. Plans, in and of themselves, would
not allow the new, larger St. Louis to realize its true potential.
According to Bartholomew, regional plans would be successful
only if “certain administrative authority [was] established at the
metropolitan level.”25
The problem for Bartholomew was
that “city growth [was] not always
Bartholomew was a major participant in the interstate movement from its inception
advantageous.” Although growth almost
in the 1930s to the passage of the National Defense Highway Act of 1956.
always led to increases in the number
Bartholomew’s original plan called for more interstate and freeway coverage for
of available jobs and to commercial
Metro East, but no beltway (like I-270/I-255), arguing that beltways stimulate
expansion, metropolitan growth could also
metropolitan sprawl rather than the “finger” growth pattern suggested here.
lead to economic and social problems.
(Photo: Guide plan, Missouri-Illinois metropolitan area…1948, Harland Bartholomew and Associates,
Growth could cause a loss of affordable
p. 25. University Archives, Department of Special Collections, Washington University Libraries)
housing for the poor, traffic congestion,
pollution, and myriad other problems.
However, Bartholomew told his readers,
“These are essentially difficulties that
spring from neglect and poor planning
rather than from basic faults inherent in
the volume of growth.” But, according to
Bartholomew, growth did not have to result
in a decline in the quality of life. Indeed,
for him, the St. Louis region could realize
its full potential by offering “its citizens
definitely improved social and economic
opportunities and gains.” And for him, this
could only occur if planning took place
at a “scale commensurate with future
needs and opportunities. It must be at the
metropolitan level.” If the new St. Louis did
not plan at a regional level, Bartholomew
warned, it would end up not only being a
“vast heterogeneous sprawl,” its continued
growth, both in terms of population and
economic strength, would also be choked
off.26
Bartholomew was hardly some wildeyed dreamer. He was every bit the realist
and political pragmatist. What he had in
mind was not a utopian neverland where
a metropolitan super-government made
all decisions according to a grand scheme
(in fact, he had testified before the Board
of Freeholders against consolidation
in 1926).27 Bartholomew knew that St.
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same reasons. Although he did not use the
term “sustainability,” Bartholomew was
talking about essentially the same thing.
However, for him, the bottom line was not
environmental, but economic. The region
could not continue to provide adequate
services and to maintain a desirable
(Photo: Guide plan, Missouri-Illinois metropolitan area…1948, Harland Bartholomew and Associates,
quality of life if developers were allowed
p. 29. University Archives, Department of Special Collections, Washington University Libraries)
to build in a scattershot fashion. The key,
according to Bartholomew, was to force
suburban growth outward along well
defined corridors that would maximize the
investment in infrastructure.
This controlled pattern of growth
could be achieved in two ways. The first
was through zoning. It would not be
enough for the planner to color in maps
that showed where certain activities were
supposed to take place. There would have
to be the means of making sure that this
is what would happen. Zoning gave the
land use plan its power. Just as in cities
(Bartholomew introduced the second major
zoning ordinance in the country in 1919), a
regional zoning ordinance would mandate
with the force of law what activities would
take place where. But if zoning ordinances
were not grounded in a land use plan (as
was the case in 1948 and now in 2009),
some municipalities would have their own
zoning ordinances while others would have
none. The result would be chaos instead of
order. Consequently, Bartholomew believed
that there could only be one regional zoning
ordinance and that it would have to be tied
to a well-crafted land use plan.29
Louisans—whether they were suburbanites or from the city—
The other tool that planners had in coercing the region to develop
would never totally give up local control. Harking back to Reed
these clearly articulated corridors, Bartholomew explained, was
and Roessel and the battle of 1930, Bartholomew framed his
its transportation plan. For Bartholomew, the skeleton of the new
argument in terms of a balance between local and metropolitanmetropolitan city was its transportation system, even more so than
wide governance and planning. Likening neighborhoods and local
it had been for the walking and streetcar cities. Where it placed
communities to human cells, Bartholomew urged his fellow St.
its highways, mass transit, rail system, and, in 1948, its airports,
Louisans to see that “while the human body depends upon the
dictated what form the region would take and where everything
health of its multitudinous cells, there are also vital single organs
would be situated.
such as the heart, the lungs and the arteries, for example, upon
Bartholomew has been mocked because of his scheme for
which the body is equally dependent for maintenance and growth.”
35 airports, hedging his bets that local personal air travel might
For him, the parallel was obvious. “Unified, integrated functioning
become a reality. But the key component of his transportation plan
of both local and major organic parts,” Bartholomew maintained,
was his interstate highway plan. A major planner in the debate on
“is as essential to the large urban community as to the human
the national highway system during the New Deal, Bartholomew
body.” Local communities should have control over their schools
had been thinking about the proper placement of the highways for
and parks, as well as their homes and local shopping areas. But the
years. Building upon his original radial design, which he developed
overall design and function of the metropolitan area would have to
in the teens, Bartholomew laid out the region’s highways like
be regionally planned and governed because the whole metropolitan fingers on a hand. Emanating from the central city, the interstates
area would be affected. Bartholomew’s message was clear. There
would direct the region’s growth inside clearly defined corridors.
were certain facilities that the whole community depended upon.
While Bartholomew provided for existing circumferential beltways
“If good,” he told St. Louisans, “the community will benefit. If not
(essentially Lindbergh), these were secondary in his plan. They
the community will be noticeably handicapped or even permanently were meant to ease downtown congestion by diverting interurban
crippled.”28
traffic around the metropolitan core. Unlike later HBA metropolitan
None of Bartholomew’s actual planning proposals were all that
plans (and even Bartholomew’s later metropolitan Washington,
surprising in the context of a career that had already spanned almost D.C. plan) which called for circumferential freeways, the 1948 plan
forty years. At the heart of his regional planning strategy—as it
did not provide for an I-270/I-255 equivalent. This is important
was for his planning paradigm—was comprehensive land use and
because most contemporary urban planners argue that such
zoning plans. Just like in a city comprehensive plan, the main
circumferential beltways do not divert inter-urban traffic as much
goal of the planner was to direct where growth was to take place
as pull metropolitan population out towards them producing the
and to explain why. While contemporary planners and regional
scattershot pattern that Bartholomew spoke against.30
policy experts are constantly talking about “suburban sprawl,” it
Another interesting point of Bartholomew’s proposal is that he
was a term that Bartholomew used sixty years ago for virtually the
placed much more emphasis on the Illinois side of the Mississippi
Although many St. Louisans now laugh at Bartholomew’s plan for 35 regional airports
first suggested in his 1947 St. Louis Comprehensive Plan, he was merely trying to
provide for the possibility of helicopters becoming commonplace. While that didn’t
come to pass, he was actually quite close to estimating the number of airports that
were built.
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than most regional plans have since. His Tentative Plan of Major
Thoroughfares provided for expressways to both Belleville and
Alton (via a north-south distributor just east of Horseshoe Lake)
in addition to what became I-64 and I-70/I-55. One could easily
argue that if these had indeed come to be, the region would have
developed in a more balanced bi-state fashion—a direction that
Bartholomew clearly favored.31
Apart from his highway plan, the aspect of the 1948 plan that
had the most long-term impact on the region was Bartholomew’s
scheme for improving the region’s water and sewer systems. St.
Louisans could pretend that municipal borders fenced off housing
and economic activities into little self-contained fiefdoms, but
that was impossible with water and sewage. Gravity and currents
held sway here. If some areas had sewers and pollution controls
and others did not, everyone was affected. Moreover, the lack of
coordination could not be glossed over by simply arguing that
it was a matter of local preference or control. It was a matter of
health, plain and simple. Sewage seeping into the drinking water,
St. Louisans knew all-too-well from the cholera epidemic that had
occurred a hundred years earlier, could be deadly. It was not too
surprising then that one of first tangible results of the guide plan
was the formation of the Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) in the
late 1950s which was created to coordinate and unify the region’s
sewer systems into one centralized system which became a model
for metropolitan regions across the country.
The last major planning element of the guide plan,
Bartholomew’s regional housing proposal, was the most
controversial—both then and now. In his 1947 comprehensive plan
for the City of St. Louis, Bartholomew had outlined his strategy
for addressing the mounting problem of deteriorated housing in
the city. Expanding on ideas that he had been developing since the
thirties, Bartholomew called for the city to demolish huge sections
of what he called “obsolete” housing—a strategy which planners
and urban policy makers have been hotly debating ever since.
For Bartholomew, this aspect of his housing plan was perhaps
the least important. What was much more important to him was
preserving the city’s good housing stock and tackling St. Louis’
housing problems in a regional manner. As Bartholomew told all
St. Louisans, “The problem of slum areas cannot be solved merely
by clearing a localized slum section in one city and forcing the
residents to move into another slum in an adjoining community,
or into unincorporated areas, nor can the problems be solved by
the construction of cheap temporary houses which in a few years
will become new slums.” Maybe most of the deteriorated housing
was in either St. Louis or East St. Louis, but it was the problem
of the whole region and, according to Bartholomew, it had to be
dealt with regionally. What this meant for him was that there would
have to be a coordinated housing program that would establish
uniform housing guidelines across the region to prevent new slums
(something that developers would not like) and that the blighted
areas would have to be rezoned to prevent them from slipping back
to being blighted.32
While he did not fully flesh out the ramifications of this last
aspect of his strategy, the implications were clear. If some poor
people were going to be displaced by urban rehabilitation, then they
would have to be relocated someplace else. Though Bartholomew
did not say it, a consolidated approach to regional housing problems
would require that all areas do their fair share in providing adequate
housing for all St. Louisans—a concept that is still being battled
over throughout the region.
The key component of the guide plan for Bartholomew was not
the planning elements; it was how they were to be implemented.
What he wanted and what he had been pushing for twenty years
was a metropolitan planning agency that would have the power to
coordinate planning activity across the region as well as the means
to undertake projects that required pooling the resources of the
entire region.

This agency Bartholomew was proposing was not something
totally of his own creation. What had been guiding his thinking
since the mid-twenties was the formation of a planning agency
similar to the New York Port Authority. Formed in 1921, the Port
Authority coordinated transportation infrastructure in the New
York-New Jersey Port District. While Bartholomew’s proposed
bi-state agency would also plan and develop transportation
facilities, it would go beyond the New York Port Authority in that
it would assume direct control of all planning and implementation
of projects metropolitan in scope. Not only would it oversee the
airport, the river docks, and regional mass transit like the Port
Authority, Bartholomew’s bi-state agency would also oversee land
use/zoning, highway placement, economic development, housing
codes, water/sewage treatment, and park systems for the entire
region. As Bartholomew told St. Louisans, this new agency would
“give better coordination of and direction to growth, and to foster if
not to provide certain types of improvements which are peculiarly
metropolitan in character.”33
Bartholomew knew what he was proposing would not be easy.
Because the real St. Louis crossed state boundaries, it would have
to be legislated through an “interstate compact” and approved by
the federal government, “which has no inconsiderable interest
at stake here.” On the other hand, Bartholomew pointed out,
these “interstate compacts have been adopted in several other
metropolitan areas bisected by state boundary lines.” What
Bartholomew knew St. Louisans really needed to be convinced of
was that the City of St. Louis was not making some power play or
that this new government would not be all powerful, obliterating
the role and identity of local municipalities as it had tried to do in
1926. “The scope and function of any new metropolitan agency,”
Bartholomew asserted, “must be limited to the more dominant
needs.” Just like the national government and its relationship to
the states, this new agency would not supplant local control, but
try to coordinate and support the actions of local municipalities. It
would “exercise full administrative authority,” Bartholomew went
on to say, “only when such authority is lacking or is not otherwise
adequately provided.”34
Having laid out the parameters of his proposed new agency,
Bartholomew’s next task was to outline what its main functions
were to be. According to him, this new agency would have three
main powers. Its primary function would be to prepare and maintain
an area-wide plan that would have all the elements of a traditional
city comprehensive plan such as land use, transportation, water/
sewage, park/recreation facilities, and housing. Again, trying to
reassure his readers, Bartholomew maintained that the “making of
such plans will not interfere with local plan commissions but should
serve to stimulate their endeavors and give much better orientation
to their work.”35
The second role of this new regional agency would be “to assist
local governmental agencies in improving and extending facilities
and services of metropolitan significance.” [italics his] According
to Bartholomew, the purpose of the new agency here was to be a
facilitator. It would enable the municipalities to do those things they
could not do by themselves. The example Bartholomew gave was
sewerage and drainage. The task of removing sewage did not end
at a municipality’s borders. Sewage removal was something that
“overlap[ped] local municipal boundaries which a metropolitan
agency could assist in planning and organizing.”36
The third role of Bartholomew’s proposed agency was the
most controversial. This function not only involved planning and
coordinating, but it also involved the actual construction, control,
and ownership of certain types of facilities that “were of a special
metropolitan character.” Not only did he want this agency to build
and operate traditional forms of public infrastructure like bridges
and tunnels, he also wanted it to construct and run facilities that
had, up until that point, been locally and privately owned such as
suburban commuter lines and airports.37
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For a lifetime Republican and a proponent of private enterprise,
Bartholomew was calling upon his fellow St. Louisans to give
up a tremendous amount of private control and ownership to
this new agency. But in his mind, it had to be done. “Large scale
operations in any field of human endeavor whether in business, in
war, or in government require centralized planning and direction,”
Bartholomew said. According to him, St. Louis had no choice.
“The alternative is chaos and waste, if not failure and defeat.” To
Bartholomew, there were two paths open to St. Louisans. Either St.
Louis could realize its “manifest destiny” for greatness by working
as one region, or it could continue to become more and more
fragmented and slip into the ranks of second tier among the new
emerging cities.38
Unfulfilled Promise
While some St. Louisans today like to mock themselves by
joking about the region’s lack of planning prowess, what is amazing
from the viewpoint of a generation removed is not how much of
what Bartholomew proposed did not come to pass, but how much
did. Literally every community in metropolitan St. Louis is planned
to some degree and practices zoning. Metro St. Louis operates
most mass transit throughout the region. The major interstates

that St. Louis was following MPA’s dictate of 1954 (the year
after Bartholomew had left St. Louis to promote regionalism in
Washington, D.C.) that St. Louis “must heed the injunction of the
late Daniel Burnham when he told the people of Chicago, ‘Make no
little plans.’” 41
But even big plans do not always “go according to plan.” In
many ways, the St. Louis region became even more disjointed,
more fragmented, and more sprawling after 1960 than it was before.
Efforts at achieving some type of federated government in St. Louis
failed in 1962 and 1987.42 The construction of circumferential
beltways (I-250/I-255) made population dispersal even more
scattered. Competing use of tax incentives produced even greater
disparities between communities in terms of resources. By the late
1980s, municipal mayors and county officials were openly feuding.
So what happened? It quickly became apparent that the super
agency that Illinois and Missouri had created and Congress had
authorized was not as super as it was first imagined. Congress had
limited the powers of the agency as it applied to federal interests
and stipulated that any extension of power had to be approved by
Congress. But the biggest problem that the agency faced was the
limitation on its ability to sell bonds to finance projects. As a result,
it was never able to accomplish all of the things it was meant to

While some St. Louisans today like to mock themselves by joking about the region’s lack of
planning prowess, what is amazing from the viewpoint of a generation removed is not how much
of what Bartholomew proposed did not come to pass, but how much did.
roughly follow Bartholomew’s suggested placements. The EastWest Gateway Coordinating Council controls much of the region’s
transportation spending. The Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD)
was created in 1959 to coordinate the region’s sewer system and has
been a model for the rest of the country. In recent years, the region
has expanded the zoo-museum district to be regional in scope and
to include several cultural organizations like the Missouri Historical
Society, as well as developing a regional system of open space and
trails through an organization called Great Rivers Greenway. Even
Bartholomew’s airport plan has largely come to be. The region has
two major airports (even though one is not needed) and actually
has more than 50 airports if the region’s heliports are included.39
But the main legacy of the plan is that the metropolitan planning
agency that Bartholomew had called for came to be. Authorized
by Congress in 1950, the compact between Illinois and Missouri
gave the Bi-State Redevelopment Authority broad planning and
implementation powers over a wide spectrum of regional facilities
and activities.40 In short, by the end of the 1950s, it appeared

and spent most of its early years begging for more power from both
the state legislatures and from Congress.43 After failing to push
through the new airport in the 1970s, Bi-State became the primary
operating agency for mass transit in the 1980s. Though it achieved
a major success in the 1990s with the creation of the first leg of
the “Metrolink” light rail system, Bi-State was officially renamed
“Metro,” and had its mission limited to just mass transit. Even here,
the scope of Bartholomew’s vision has been diminished. Losing an
ugly court case involving cost overruns with the most recent leg
of the Metrolink system and failing at the polls to find additional
funding support for the agency, Metro has reduced its service by a
third during 2008.44
Realizing that Bi-State was not going to save the region, St.
Louis regionalists tried to come up with yet another agency in the
mid-1960s. In 1965, jumping on new federal legislation, the St.
Louis region created the first a formal confederation of municipal
governments (COG), the East-West Gateway Coordinating
Council, in the nation. Basically a council of governments,

Fifty years ahead of his time, Bartholomew envisioned an urban rail system like Metrolink that would connect different regions
together. (Photo: Lindenwood University)
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East-West Gateway represents St. Louis City, plus St. Louis, St.
Charles, Franklin, and Jefferson counties in Missouri, as well as
St. Clair, Madison, and Monroe counties in Illinois. Although
the federal government has given COGs like East-West Gateway
a tremendous amount of power over federal monies, especially
transportation funds, East-West Gateway has lacked from the very
beginning the necessary power to sell bonds or the authority to
force implementation of its plans. Moreover, because it is a council
of governments, with its board dominated by elected politicians,
it has lacked the political will to call for sweeping changes or new
powers.45
As a result of these limited regional initiatives—61 years after
Harland Bartholomew sketched out what a regional plan might
look like and might do—the region is still waiting for its first
real comprehensive plan for the region or an agency that has the

power to realize a regional strategy. So, while other regions have
adopted Bartholomew’s vision for a coordinated approach to
regional issues, St. Louis continues to find itself flailing away at
piecemeal solutions to regional problems. Consequently, the “real”
St. Louis falls farther and farther behind more successful regions.
Able to pool their resources more effectively through meaningful
planning, regions like Minneapolis, Denver, Seattle, and Portland
have not only been able to expand economically and in terms of
their population, but also have made themselves more livable in
the process. Although St. Louisans have resisted regional planning
in the name of community control, maybe it is time to heed
Bartholomew’s warning that if we do not take control of the region
as a region “the alternative is chaos and waste, if not failure and
defeat.”
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